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Abstract—A schedule coordination problem involving two 
train services provided by different operators is modeled as an 
optimization of revenue intake. The coordination is achieved 
through the adjustment of commencement times of the train 
services by negotiation. The problem is subject to constraints 
regarding to passenger demands and idle costs of rolling-stocks 
from both operators. This paper models the operators as 
software agents having the flexibility to incorporate one of the 
two (and potentially more) proposed negotiation strategies. 
Empirical results show that agents employing different 
combination of strategies have significant impact on the quality 
of solution and negotiation time. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N open railway access market basically consists of an 
infrastructure provider (IP) and a number of train service 
providers (TSPs). The TSPs may either compete directly by 
serving identical railway lines or, more commonly, compete 
moderately by serving overlapping lines. Through the tension 
generated from these competitions, the railways are not only 
expected to utilize their resources more efficiently, but quality 
of service may also be improved to attract more transportation 
demands towards the railways. 
An example of moderate competition is shown in Fig. 1. 
TSP-1 is operating a line to and from stations A and F, 
stopping at intermediate stations B, C, D and E. On the other 
hand, TSP-2 is operating a line to and from stations G and J, 
dwelling at stations H, C, D, E and I. Despite the competition 
of passenger demand between stations C to E, it is possible to 
improve the revenue intake for both parties if passengers can 
travel across the two lines by coordinating the train schedules 
at a common transfer node (e.g. station C). 
The schedule coordination problem in integrated railways, 
where train services are solely provided by a single authority, 
often concerns on the minimization of passenger waiting time 
by adjusting the commencement times of a set of train services. 
Such problem has been extensively studied in the literature. 
When coordinating train services at a single station, the arrival 
times of a service have been modeled by a set of vertices of a 
polygon within a unit circle [1], [2]. The problem is then to 
minimize the total arc lengths between the vertices on the 
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circumference of the circle. When coordinating a set of trains 
at multiple transfer stations, the problem has been shown to be 
NP-hard [3] and it has been solved using a brand-and-bound 
algorithm for optimal solution [3], and using a genetic 
algorithm for near-optimal solutions [4].  
Despite the efforts in the schedule coordination problem in 
the integrated railways, the effect of open market has altered 
the nature of the problem. Firstly, the lines are now managed 
by different TSPs instead of a single authority. As a result, the 
alignment of schedules requires a mutual agreement from 
more than one party, whose operating constraints and 
objectives may be in conflicts with the other operators. In 
particular, there may be constraints regarding to the earliest 
commencement time due to the availability of rolling-stock, 
and it is also desirable to consider the cost of idle time for the 
rolling-stock. Moreover, sensitive data such as cost rates are 
unlikely to reveal to the other TSP. This means decisions on 
the coordinated schedules are often made under incomplete 
information through negotiation activities. These changes 
prompt the remodeling of the schedule coordination problem.  
Agent modeling [5] is particularly suitable for constructing 
distributed systems where entities are self-interested, and 
interact through communicative acts such as negotiation [6]. 
The modeling technique enables a high level of autonomy to 
the entities (called agents) by the encapsulation of data and 
reasoning logic. Applications of agent modeling are growing 
in railways, and they include the train coupling and sharing 
problem [7] and the conflict resolution of track access right 
between IP and TSP [8]-[10]. 
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Fig. 1.  Competition between two railway lines.  
  
 
This paper proposes an agent negotiation model for a 
schedule coordination problem involving two train services at 
a single transfer station. Section II defines a formal model of 
the problem. Section III then describes the algorithm used in 
generating offers during the negotiation. Section IV presents 
the simulation results of a simple example. Finally, Section V 
delivers the conclusion. 
II. NEGOTIATION MODELS 
A. Cost Function 
Let iL  denotes the operation of a service by TSP- i . The 
commencement time for iL  at the first station is iζ . Consider 
the problem involving two railway services, iL  and jL , both 
of which have a common intermediate station at X . Given 
integer values of ),( ji ζζ , the net revenue collected from the 
transfer of passengers is model by (1).  
)(),(),( iijijiii FGkGkY ζζζζζ −+=   (1) 
where iY  is the net increase in revenue of iL ; ik  is the 
average cost charged to a transferring passenger; ),( jiG ζζ is 
the passenger demand for transferring from iL  to jL ; and 
)( iF ζ  is the cost of idle time.  
1) Definition of ),( jiG ζζ : Let ih  be the total time needed 
for iL  to arrive at X  from the first station, id  be the dwell 
time, and ijκ  be the minimum transfer time for passenger 
moving from iL  to jL , then the passenger waiting time ijw  
can be expressed by (2). 
ijiijjjij hdhw κζζ −+−++= )()(   (2) 
Passenger demand is assumed to be affected by the amount 
of waiting time at X . The longer is the waiting time, the lower 
is the demand. In this study, the demand from iL  to jL  in 
relation to the waiting time is modeled by a quadratic function 
in (3) subject to (4). 
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mijij wz ≤+−≤ ζζ0   (4) 
where ijijjij hdhz κ−−+= , and mw  is the lowest waiting 
time resulting in zero demand. When the waiting time is zero, 
the function achieves maximum demand at ijGˆ . As the waiting 
time increases, progressively more passengers will opt for 
alternative means of travel such as automobiles.  
2) Definition of )( iF ζ : Let miζ  be the earliest time that the 
rolling-stock is available at the first station. This is often 
known as the release date in scheduling. If iL  commences at  
m
iζ , then the idle cost is zero. As the time is postponed, the 
idle cost increases proportionally. Let ic  be the unit cost of 
idle time. )( iF ζ  is then modeled by (5) subject to (6). 
)()( miiii cF ζζζ −=   (5) 
m
ii ζζ ≥   (6) 
B. Negotiation Procedures 
Negotiation is conducted by exchanging offers in a series of 
negotiation rounds. The TSP agent submitting the first offer is 
called the initiator. The negotiating partner (proponent) is 
called the responder. 
An offer at round k  consists of the proposed 
commencement times of the initiator and the responder. 
Without the loss of generality, the initiator and responder are 
assigned to be TSP- i  and TSP- j  respectively. An offer is 
therefore modeled by (7). 
),( kjkikO ζζ=   (7) 
The cost associated with the offer kO  is assumed to be 
stored internally by the agent, represented by kiY . Suppose 
TSP- i  is the initiator, then the offers in the odd rounds of 
negotiation (i.e. 12 −= mk , for ...,2,1=m ) are proposed by 
TSP- i , while offers in the even rounds of negotiation (i.e. 
 
Fig. 2.  Negotiation procedure. 
  
 
mk 2= ) are generated by TSP- j . 
The general negotiation procedure is shown in Fig. 2. The 
action set of an agent are {propose, accept, failure}. At the 
beginning, the initiator generates the offer which maximizes 
(1) subject to (4) and (6). If the offer exists, it is proposed to 
the proponent. Otherwise, no action is taken. Upon the arrival 
of the counteroffer from the proponent, the agent evaluates the 
associated cost of the counteroffer and updates kO ˆ , which is 
the first occurrence of counteroffer with the highest cost kiY
ˆ
 
received at round kˆ . In addition, the agent also computes the 
next potential offer *O  using one of the strategies, Spo or Smax, 
which are described in the following subsection. If no 
potential offer can be found, the negotiation is terminated with 
the failure action. If the offer does exist, the agent proposes 
*O  when kii YY
ˆ* > , and accepts kO ˆ  otherwise. 
C. Negotiation Strategies 
1) Spo: This strategy aims to derive the Pareto-optimal 
solution and it requires both agents to employ this strategy to 
achieve the objective. According to the definition of 
Pareto-optimality [11], a solution s  is Pareto-optimal if there 
does not exist any alternative solution 's  which improves the 
costs of all negotiating parties. 
By definition, the initiator is proposing at rounds 
12 −= mk  while the responder is proposing at rounds 
mk 2= . In other words, the sequence of offers generated by 
the initiator is 1231 ...,,, −mOOO  and the sequence of offers of 
the responder is mOOO 242 ...,,, . In this strategy, the feasible 
offers of an agent are arranged in descending order of their 
costs, that is, for the initiator, 121
3
1
1
1 ...
−≥≥≥ mYYY  and for the 
responder, mYYY 22
4
2
2
2 ... ≥≥≥ .  
The property of the above strategy can be proved by 
contradiction.  Assume the condition of acceptance is detected 
by the initiator after round Dk  and 
kO ˆ  is accepted. If kO ˆ  is 
not Pareto-optimal, then there exists another offer 'O  that 
does not decrease the cost of either agent. To determine 
whether such offer does exist, the offers are divided into three 
partitions as shown in Fig. 3. 
Partition A: This partition consists of the proposals prior to 
round kˆ . In the odd rounds within this set (i.e. km ˆ12 <− ), 
although the costs of the initiator are higher (i.e. km YY ˆ1121 ≥− ), 
the costs of the responder are lower (i.e. km YY ˆ2122 <− ). 
Otherwise the condition of acceptance would have been 
detected by the responder (Fig. 3). Since these solutions cause 
a decrease in 2Y , they are not Pareto-optimal. On the other 
hand, in the even rounds (i.e. km ˆ2 < ), although the costs of 
the responder are higher (i.e. km YY ˆ222 ≥ ), the costs of the 
initiator are smaller (i.e. km YY ˆ121 < ) because by definition, kY
ˆ
1  
is the first highest cost among the counteroffers. Therefore, 
these solutions are also not Pareto-optimal.  
Partition B: This partition consists of the proposals between 
round kˆ  and 1+Dk  exclusively. For the costs in the odd 
rounds, the same argument holds as in partition A. In the even 
rounds ( 12ˆ +<< Dkmk ), both costs are smaller by definition. 
In brief, all the other offers that have been proposed cannot 
improve 1Y  and 2Y  simultaneously. 
Partition C: To examine the remaining offers that have not 
been proposed, suppose the negotiation continues.  In the odd 
rounds of negotiation, 1Y  is decreasing, so even if 
kYY ˆ22 > , 
the offer is not Pareto-optimal. Similarly, in the even rounds 
of negotiation, since 2Y  is decreasing, these proposals cannot 
be Pareto-optimal.  
As a result, no offers can improve the costs of both parties 
simultaneously when the condition of acceptance is detected 
by the initiator. The proof for the responder can be 
constructed in a similar manner. This completes the proof. 
2) Smax: To reach the Pareto-optimal solution, both parties 
must employ Spo. Despite the theoretical significance of such 
solution, in practice, stakeholders often aim to achieve a better 
cost, even if the proponent suffers from a loss. As a 
consequence, it is also worth examining other negotiation 
strategies (or combination of strategies), and compare their 
resultant offers from the Pareto-optimal solution obtained by 
Spo.  
In strategy Smax, it is assumed that only one variable can be 
changed in 1+kO  with respect to the counteroffer kO . The 
agent determines which variable, either 1−kiζ  or 1−kjζ , should 
be changed in order to maximize the difference of kii YY −
*
. 
III. ALGORITHM FOR OFFER GENERATION 
In the definitions of the negotiation strategies, it has been 
assumed that an algorithm exists in generating the necessary 
offers. In this section, a simple algorithm from the perspective 
 
Fig. 3.  Illustration of proof of Pareto-optimality. 
  
 
of TSP- i is proposed for each strategy.  
1) Spo: Let in  be the maximum allowable adjustment on the 
commencement time from the release date of TSP- i . If the 
earliest arrival times at the transfer station X  for both train 
services are expected to be at close proximity, then Spo may 
employ the following algorithm for offer generation provided 
that ijjii nhh <<+−+ )()( ζζ , where <<  represents 
significantly smaller than. 
Step 1: Compute the costs for all combination of solutions 
),( ji ζζ  for imiimi n+≤≤ ζζζ  and iji nn +≤≤− '' ζζζ , 
where ji
m
i hh −+= ζζ ' . 
Step 2: Sort the solutions in descending order of their costs 
using a sorting algorithm such as the Quicksort. 
The above algorithm intuitively generates all the possible 
offers expected to encounter during the negotiation. Since the 
release date of the proponent is an unknown, it is estimated by 
the earliest arrival time of its service and the journey time of 
the proponent’s service. As the release date may either be 
earlier or later than this estimation, the upper and lower 
bounds are calculated by adding and subtracting by in  
respectively. in  can be taken as 60min if the earliest arrival 
times are at close proximity (e.g. within 10min). 
2) Smax: Let the most recent counteroffer received be 
),( ** ji ζζ . With the same definitions of in  and 'ζ , the 
algorithm for Smax is given as follows. 
Step 1: Compute the costs of all solutions ),( * ji ζζ , for 
iji nn +≤≤− '' ζζζ . 
Step 2: Compute the costs of all solutions ),( *ji ζζ , for  
i
m
ii
m
i n+≤≤ ζζζ . 
Step 3: Select the best offer from steps 1 and 2. If the offer 
has been proposed previously, select the next best offer. 
IV. SIMULATION SETUP AND RESULTS 
A. Simulation Setup 
The negotiation model is implemented with the aid of 
JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) [12]. JADE is a 
FIPA-compliant software framework which provides generic 
functions for agent development. 
Table I shows the settings of two TSP agents which are used 
in the simulation studies. Using the data, the two agents are set 
up to conduct four negotiations with different combinations of 
strategies. If (S1, S2) denotes the strategies employed by 
TSP-1 and TSP-2 respectively, the four combinations are (Spo, 
Spo), (Spo, Smax), (Smax, Spo), and (Smax, Smax). 
B. Results 
All four negotiations have been able to settle at an 
agreement, and the results are summarized in Table II. The 
Pareto-optimal solution has been found to be ),( 21 ζζ = 
)5,13( . In this table, the costs in percentage are calculated 
with respect to this solution. 
1) Operation of Strategies: To demonstrate how the two 
strategies lead to an agreement, the negotiation of (Smax, Spo) is 
examined in further detail.  
TSP-1 first initiates the negotiation by proposing )0,8(  – 
the offer that maximizes its cost function. The corresponding 
cost for TSP-2 is zero because the suggested commencement 
time is less than the released date. Since TSP-2 is employing 
Spo, it generates the sequence of offers in descending order of 
costs. The top five offers are shown under the column of 
potential offer in Table III. According to this sequence, TSP-2 
counter-proposes )5,16(  to TSP-1. 
The cost of )5,16(  for TSP-1 is 87.0% (Table IV) with 
respect to the cost of its best offer )0,8( . By Smax, TSP-1 
TABLE III 
COUNTEROFFERS AND POTENTIAL OFFERS FOR TSP-2 
Round Counteroffer Potential Offer 
 
),( 21 ζζ  2Y , (%) ),( 21 ζζ  2Y , (%) 
1 (8, 0) 0.0  (16, 5) 100.0  
3 (13, 5) 97.0  (17, 5) 100.0  
5 (12, 5) 97.0  (15, 5) 99.5  
7 (14, 5) 98.5  (18, 5) 99.4  
9 (15, 5) 99.5  (14, 5) 98.5  
 
TABLE IV 
COUNTEROFFERS AND POTENTIAL OFFERS FOR TSP-1 
Round Counteroffer Potential Offer 1 Potential Offer 2 
 
),( 21 ζζ  1Y , (%) ),( 21 ζζ  1Y , (%) ),( 21 ζζ  1Y , (%) 
2 (16, 5) 87.0  (16, 4) 86.9  (13, 5) 89.9  
4 (17, 5) 84.9  (17, 6) 84.9  (12, 5) 89.7  
6 (15, 5) 88.5  (15, 4) 89.0  (14, 5) 89.4  
8 (18, 5) 82.3  (18, 7) 82.9  (15, 5) 88.5  
 
TABLE II 
SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
(Spo, Spo) 
(Spo, Smax) (Smax, Spo) (Smax , Smax) 
),( 21 ζζ , (min) (13, 5) (15, 5) (14, 6) 
),( 21 YY , (%) (100, 100) (98.5, 102.6) (97.7, 98.4) 
),( 2112 ww , (min) (7, 1) (5, 3) (7, 1) 
Rounds 61 11 10 
 
TABLE I 
SIMULATION SETUP 
mw , (min) 20 
 1=i  2=i  
ic , ($/min) 50 60 
m
iζ , (min) 7 5 
ik , ($/person) 15 22 
ih , (min) 20 30 
id , (min) 5 7 
 12=ij  21=ji  
ijGˆ , (person) 100 80 
ijκ , (min) 2 2 
 
  
 
generates two offers from this offer by holding either 1ζ  or 
2ζ  constant. These are )4,16(  and )5,13(  respectively. 
Since the cost of the latter offer is greater, TSP-1 selects 
)5,13(  as the potential offer. As the cost is also larger than 
that of the counteroffer, TSP-1 proposes )5,13(  to TSP-2. 
In Table III, the cost of )5,13( for TSP-2 is 97%. Upon the 
reception of the counteroffer, TSP-2 finds that the cost of the 
second best offer is )5,17(  and its cost is larger than the cost 
of the best counteroffer received so far. Thus, it is proposed to 
the TSP-1.  
The process iterates, where TSP-1 and TSP-2 propose 
alternately with offers )5,12( , )5,15( , )5,14( , )5,18(  and 
)5,15( . For TSP-2, the cost is 99.5%, which is higher than the 
next potential offer available, that is, 98.5%. TSP-2 therefore 
secures the agreement with )5,15( . 
2) Quality of Solutions: According to Table II, not only (Spo, 
Spo) and (Spo, Smax) reach the same Pareto-optimal solution, 
but they also require the same amount of negotiation rounds to 
complete the transaction. However, the adoption of Smax by 
TSP-2 clearly leads to different solution paths (Fig. 4 and 5). 
The figures show the change in costs for TSP-1 for the entire 
process, and the change in costs for TSP-2 in the even rounds 
of the negotiation. When both agents employ (Spo, Spo), the 
odd rounds of TSP-1 and even rounds of TSP-2 decrease 
monotonically. Yet, the costs in the even rounds due to the 
counteroffers from TSP-2 are fluctuating. This is consistent 
with the definition of the strategy. On the other hand, when 
TSP-2 employs Smax, its costs do not change monotonically 
because Smax generates offers by modifying the counteroffer 
received in the previous round. Hence, the solution can either 
be higher or lower than its previous offer. The fluctuations 
may sometime be very large because it highly depends on the 
quality of the counteroffers received. 
The solution of (Smax, Spo) is not Pareto-optimal since the 
cost of TSP-1 is lower, even though TSP-2 has been benefited 
from an increase in cost. Similarly, the solution of (Smax, Smax) 
is not Pareto-optimal because the costs of both agents are 
smaller. The concession curves are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 
respectively. 
From the passenger perspective, the Pareto-optimal 
solution requires waiting times of 7min, and 1min for the 
transfers from 1L  to 2L , and 1L  to 2L  respectively. As for 
the suboptimal solutions, (Smax, Spo) reduces the waiting time 
of the transfer from 1L  to 2L  by two minutes but increases 
the waiting time by the same amount in the reverse direction. 
On the other hand, the waiting times obtained by (Smax, Smax) 
are identical to the Pareto-optimal solution. In other words, 
despite the differences resulted to the two TSPs, the change is 
unnoticeable to the passengers.  
3) Negotiation Time: The number of rounds required for 
negotiation is also shown in Table II. Despite the ability to 
determine the Pareto-optimal solution, (Spo, Spo) requires a 
substantial amount of rounds before the negotiation is settled. 
On the other hand, (Smax, Spo) and (Smax, Smax) are able to 
 
Fig. 4.  Concession curves (SPO vs. Spo). 
 
Fig. 5.  Concession curves (Spo vs. Smax). 
 
Fig. 6.  Concession curves (Smax vs. Spo). 
 
Fig. 7.  Concession curves (Smax vs. Smax). 
  
 
reduce the number of rounds considerably with small 
deviations to the TSPs costs. The use of Smax seems to shorten 
the time required to complete the transaction. 
By attempting to reduce the concession with reference to 
the counteroffer, the agent employing Smax is likely to concede 
in larger steps in successive negotiation rounds.  
V. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a model for the schedule coordination 
problem involving two train services in an open access market. 
The problem has been modeled as two separate agents 
conducting individual optimizations, but interacting through 
negotiation. Through the agent negotiation process, the TSPs 
are enabled to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. 
With the proposed negotiation framework, the agents are 
also allowed to employ their own negotiation strategies. Two 
negotiation strategies have been proposed. Spo is derived so 
that when both agents are employing this strategy, the 
resulting agreement is guaranteed to reach the Pareto-optimal 
solution. However, as suggested by the simulation result, Spo 
often requires a large number of simulation rounds before the 
agreement can be settled. To reduce the possibility of 
excessive negotiation time, TSP may opt for the use of Smax, 
which tends to concede at larger steps by modifying the 
counteroffers from the proponent. Nevertheless, the TSP is 
under a risk of deviating from the Pareto-optimal solution. 
The paper also generates further research opportunities. For 
example, the algorithms used for the negotiation strategies 
may be replaced by more intelligent searching algorithms. 
Since the cost function in (1) is inherently quadratic in nature, 
the authors are examining the possible use of quadratic 
programming with the incorporation of a tree searching 
algorithm. In addition, it is also worth investigating the 
performance of other negotiation strategies other than the 
proposed ones in the paper. 
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